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ABSTRACT . We study the relation between the trading behavior of agents
and volatility in toy markets of adaptive inductively rational agents. We show
that excess volatility, in such simplified markets, arises as a consequence of i)
the neglect of market impact implicit in price taking behavior and of ii) exces-
sive reactivity of agents. These issues are dealt with in detail in the simple case
without public information. We also derive, for the general case, the critical
learning rate above which trading behavior leads to turbulent dynamics of the
market.
KEYWORDS : statistical mechanics, El Farol bar problem, minority games,
market impact, adaptive learning.
1. Introduction
The El Farol bar problem (Arthur, 1994) and its later refinement, the Minority
Game (MG) (Challet and Zhang, 1997), where devised to study the competitive
interaction of boundedly rational agents in socio-economic contexts. In the El
Farol bar problem agents face the binary choice of either attending or not a
bar which is enjoyable only if it is not too crowded. Arthur (1994) showed that
inductive rationality is enough for the average attendance to self-organize around
the comfort capacity of the bar.
The El Farol bar context is simplified even further in the Minority Game.
Again agents compete in forecasting what the majority will do, in order to be
on the opposite side, which is the rewarding one. Agents, like speculators in
c© 2018 HERMES
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a financial market (Zhang, 1998), try to exploit predictability of the “market”.
This speculative pressure drives the system in a self-organized state where, on
average, half of the agents take each of the two possible actions at each time.
This confirms the naive expectation that speculative trading eliminates arbi-
trages – i.e. predictable patterns – in markets. In addition, the MG allows to
focus attention on the fluctuations around the average and allows to address
the question of whether and to which extent adaptive agents reduce or amplify
fluctuations. Fluctuations in the MG are directly related to the profit losses and
hence to wastes of resources. This is reminiscent of volatility in financial markets,
which is an undesirable consequence of speculative trading.
The MG describes in a nutshell the interplay between predictability and volatil-
ity in a market with speculative trading. Since it allows to quantify both pre-
dictability H and volatility σ2 (see below), the MG allows to address questions of
both information efficiency (predictability) and market stochasticity (volatility).
Much numerical work (Challet and Zhang, 1997; Savit et al., 1999; Johnson et
al., 1998; Cavagna, 1999; Challet and Marsili, 1999; Cavagna et al., 1999) as well
as approximate analytical approaches (Zhang, 1998; Challet and Zhang, 1998;
Johnson et al., 1999) have been devoted to the understanding of the MG†. This
has culminated in the exact solution (Challet et al., 2000A; Marsili et al., 2000)
in the limit of infinitely many agents, thanks to statistical mechanics tools of
disordered systems (Mezard et al., 1987). The emerging picture is that the spec-
ulative trading of agents actually minimizes market’s predictability. As the num-
ber of agents increases, predictability is reduced and beyond a critical number
of agents, the market becomes unpredictable (to agents). At the same time also
the volatility of the market decreases. Beyond the critical number, however, the
market remains unpredictable but volatility starts increasing. In addition excess
volatility due to crowd effects arise, which manifest in an anti-persistent behavior
of the market (Savit et al., 1999; Challet and Marsili, 1999).
If the competitive aspects of the MG are related to predictability, from the
point of view of volatility the MG is similar in nature to coordination games
(Myerson, 1997). Indeed among all possible ways to exploit market’s predictabil-
ity, each agent has incentives to favor those which reduce market’s volatility.
Since the MG is a closed dynamical system, fluctuations inevitably depend on
the behavior of agents.
Here we study in detail the relation between volatility and the behavior of
agents. There are two key aspects of agent behavior which have been found to
dramatically affect volatility in the MG:
1 The market impact and the extent to which agents account for it. In the
original MG, agents neglect their market impact and behave as price tak-
ers‡. This behavior minimizes market’s predictability but this leads to large
† A collection of references on the Minority Game is available at the site
http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/minority.
‡ Price taking behavior means that, when an agent considers counter-factually the results
of the various choice he/she could have made, he/she does not account for the fact that the
market “price” depends on the choice he/she actually made. If he/she had taken a different
decision the “price” also would have changed. In few words, one may say that agents, rather
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volatility increases (crowd effects) when the market is crowded. This ex-
cess volatility is dramatically reduced as soon as agents start accounting,
even approximately, for their impact. When agents behave strategically,
properly accounting for their impact on the market, volatility is reduced to
zero.
2 Agents reactivity, i.e. how readily and strongly do agents react to the out-
come of the game. Fast learning rates may dramatically enhance volatility
in the MG, with respect to that with small learning rates.
These results were found recently for the MG in its full complexity (Challet
et al., 2000A; Marsili et al., 2000) and for a modified version of it (Cavagna
et al., 1999)†. Here we derive these result in the simplest case where there is
no public information. This case allows for a quite simple treatment where the
result is not obscured by the technicalities needed to deal with the MG with
information.
In addition it allows to understand the origin of enhanced volatility for fast
learning rates. This arises as a transition from a smooth dynamics to a more
complex dynamical behavior which is reminiscent of chaotic or turbulent systems.
Then we move to the MG with information and briefly review the results of
Marsili et al. (2000). In addition we derive a new result for the critical learning
rate, as a function of α above which crowd effects arise in the MG.
We close with some discussion of the results.
2. The model without information
The MG is a toy model of a market under the simplifying assumption that the
market is a repeated game of N interacting agents. In real markets, agents can
decide not to participate. In addition real agents trade at different frequencies.
In the MG all agents have to trade at each time step. If ai(t) represents the
investment of agent i at time t, his/her profit from this transaction is
ui(t) = ai(t)R[A(t)/N ], A(t) =
N∑
j=1
aj(t). (2.1)
The return R(A/N) depends on the aggregate investment A(t). This functional
dependence embodies the market mechanism and it must be such that agents
cannot extract a positive profit from just trading. Hence the game is a negative
sum game:
N∑
i=1
ui(t) = A(t)R[A(t)/N ] ≤ 0, ∀t. (2.2)
In addition we further assume that ai(t) can take only two values ±1. Hence
agents choosing the minority sign ai = −sign A gain a profit |R(A/N)| whereas
than playing against other rational agents, thinks as if they were playing against an exogenous
price process.
† Challet et al. (2000C) showed that the model introduced by Cavagna et al. (1999) has
exactly the same collective behavior of the original MG in the limit N →∞.
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the majority of agents loose an amount −|R(A/N)|. The simplest choice R(x) =
−x will be made henceforth‡
Naively, each player faces the problem of anticipating what the majority will
do, in order to do the opposite. This is similar in essence to the El Farol bar
problem (Arthur, 1994) and to many other situations where players have to share
a limited resource.
The last ingredient of the MG is public information. Since the effects which
we wish to focus on emerge even in the absence of public information, we shall
introduce this ingredient later on.
Let us generalize the model and allow agents to behave in a stochastic way.
Hence we introduce the probabilities πi with which agent i plays action ai = +1
(with Prob{ai = −1} = 1 − πi). With πi = 0 or 1 we recover the deterministic
case, whereas πi = 1/2 means that agent i relies on the toss of a fair coin, to
decide his/her action. Expected values over πi are denoted by 〈. . .〉.
For any state ~π = (π1, . . . , πN ), we define
H(~π) = 〈A〉2, 〈A〉 =
N∑
i=1
(2πi − 1) (2.3)
and
σ2(~π) ≡ 〈A2〉 = H + 4
N∑
i=1
πi(1− πi). (2.4)
H measures information efficiency. Indeed H > 0 implies 〈A〉 6= 0 which means
that one can predict the minority action −sign 〈A〉. When H = 0 the outcome
A is unpredictable. In both cases, σ2 is simply related to the total loss of agents
σ2 = −N∑i〈ui〉 and hence it measures optimality. Volatility can be defined as
the excess fluctuations σ2 −H of the market.
3. Nash equilibria
The key concept to analyze the outcome of strategic interactions are the Nash
equilibria of game theory (Myerson, 1997). The MG is an n−players game, where
each agent i may play pure strategies ai = +1 or −1 – or mixed strategies πi –
and the payoff matrix is specified by Eq. (2.1). Nash equilibria (Myerson, 1997)
are defined as those states ~π in which agents have no payoff incentive to change
their behavior.
The purpose of this section is to provide a reference framework for our later
discussion on adaptive agents. More precisely it is of interest to undestand under
what conditions adaptive learning can lead to the outcome one would expect from
rational players, i.e. to a Nash equilibrium. Hence we shall limit our discussion
to a rather elementary level†.
Let us consider a state ~π(j) where N−2j agents play mixed strategies πi = 1/2
‡ This is justified a posteriori by power expansion of R(x) in x because A(t) is typically of
order
√
N . The original choice in (Challet and Zhang, 1997; Savit et al., 1999) had R(x) = signx
which can also be dealt with similarly (see appendix of Challet et al., 2000B).
† In what follows, Nash equilibria are vectors ~π such that no agent can increase his/her
payoff by changing his/her mixes strategy πi, if others stick to theirs.
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and 2j play pure strategies. The frozen agents playing pure strategies are divided
into two groups of j agents playing opposite actions. This is a Nash equilibrium.
In order to show this, we observe that the 2j agents playing pure strategies have
no incentive to change it, because if they deviate from their strategy they suffer
a loss. Agents playing mixed strategies must, on the other hand be indifferent
between the two action, which occurs if 〈A− ai〉 =
∑
j 6=i(2πj − 1) = 0.
Overall, by simple combinatorics we find that there are
Ω(N) =
[N/2]∑
j=0
2
(
N
N − 2j
)(
2j
j
)
− 1 (3.1)
Nash equilibria of this form (here [N/2] is the integer part of [N/2]). For N even,
the information efficiency and optimality of these equilibria are quantified by
H(~π(j)) = 0, σ2(~π(j)) = N − 2j. (3.2)
This makes it clear that agents playing mixed strategies π
(j)
i = 1/2 are those
who contribute to the value of σ2. Hence they are responsible for inefficiencies
(excess volatility). As the number j of frozen agent pairs increases the equilibrium
becomes more and more efficient† and σ2 decreases. The equilibria ~π([N/2]), where
agents attain the minimal value of σ2, shall be called optimal henceforth. At the
other extreme, the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all agents play mixed
strategies (π
(0)
i = 1/2 for all i) is the most inefficient.
The number of frozen agents can increase if we allow for coordination devices
such as binding agreements or public information. If agents i and k, playing
(πi, πk) = (1/2, 1/2) coordinate their actions choosing to play either (πi, πk) =
(0, 1) or (πi, πk) = (1, 0) with some probability, their payoffs increase (which
increases the payoffs of other agents as well). By this, however, we are assuming
that the two agents play in a correlated way‡. Iteration of this argument suggests
that agents will naturally choose one of the optimal equilibria ~π([N/2]) if they can
correlate their play.
Summarizing, the single stage game has an huge number of Nash equilibria for
N ≫ 1 (Eq. 3.1). This raises the problem of equilibrium selection: Which of these
equilibria describes the behavior of deductive rational agents? Unfortunately
game theory, on the basis of rationality and common knowledge alone, does not
provide an unambiguous answer to this question.
Since Nash equilbria are very different in nature, with values of σ2 ranging
from 0 to N , this means that, in fact, we cannot draw any conclusion at all.
Hence, as suggested by Arthur (1994), one has to abandon deductive rationality
and replace game-theoretic players by inductively rational adaptive agents.
† In game theoretical terms one may say that for any Nash equilibrium π(j) there is an
equilibrium π(j+1) which is Pareto dominant: In the latter each agent is not worse off than in
the first and there is at least one agent which is strictly better off.
‡ We refer the reader to (Myerson, 1997) for a detailed discussion of coordination games
and correlated equilibria.
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4. Adaptive agents
Agents are adaptive, in the sense that they learn from past experience which
choice is the best one. The past experience of agent i is stored in ∆i(t) which
is related to the cumulated payoff of the two possible actions. ∆i(t) > 0 means
that the action ai = +1 is (perceived as) more successful than ai = −1 and
vice-versa. On the basis of their experience ∆i(t) up to time t, the behavior of
agents is described by
Prob{ai(t) = ±1} ≡ 1±mi(t)
2
, with mi(t) = χi[∆i(t)] (4.1)
The function χi(x) is an increasing function of x with limx→±∞ χi(x) = ±1.
Hence the probability with which agent i plays action ai = ±1 increases with
∆i(t).
The connection with mixed strategies is mi = 2πi − 1. Here we choose a
different notation to stress the fact that mi(t) is not a mixed strategy, but rather
it encodes a behavioral rule. Note that mi = 〈ai〉.
The way in which ∆i(t) is updated is the last element of the learning dynamics.
We assume that
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− 1
N
[A(t)− ηiai(t)] (4.2)
The idea is: if agent i observes A(t) < 0 he/she will generally increase ∆i and
hence his/her probability of playing ai = +1 at the next time step. The ηi term
above describe the fact that agent i may account for his/her own contribution
to A(t). For ηi = 1 indeed, agent i considers only the behavior of other agents
A(t) − ai(t) and does not react to his/her own action ai(t).
The question of interest is: Do agents converge to a Nash equilibrium under
this dynamics? If yes, to which equilibrium do agents converge?
4.1. Naive agents ηi = 0
In the MG agents are naive and do not account for their impact on the aggre-
gate, i.e. ηi = 0.
Let us focus on the long time dynamics for N ≫ 1. In particular we follow
(Marsili et al., 2000) and introduce a time variable τ = t/N . A superscript (c)
denotes variables in the continuum time (e.g. ∆
(c)
i (τ) = ∆i(Nτ)). Then
∆
(c)
i (τ + dτ) = ∆
(c)
i (τ) −
1
N
N(τ+dτ)∑
t=Nτ
A(t). (4.3)
For N ≫ 1 we can use the law of large numbers and conclude that the last term
is well approximated by −dτ〈A〉τ . Here the subscript τ implies that the average
is taken over the probabilities [1±m(c)i (τ)]/2 of the actions ai = ±1, and we are
assuming that χi(x) is smooth enough (see later) so that these probabilities are
approximately constant over the time interval [τ, τ + dτ). Hence we find that
∆˙
(c)
i (τ) = −〈A〉τ = −
N∑
i=1
m
(c)
i (τ). (4.4)
Volatility in toy markets 7
It is quite easy to find thatH is minimized along the trajectories of the learning
dynamics with ηi = 0 for all i.
Indeed, with the notation 〈. . .〉τ for averages taken at time τ
H˙ = 2〈A〉τ
N∑
i=1
∂〈A〉τ
∂m
(c)
i
m˙
(c)
i = −2H
N∑
i=1
χ′i(∆
(c)
i ) (4.5)
where we have assumed that 〈χi(∆i)〉τ ≃ χi(∆(c)i ), which is correct to leading
order in 1/N .
Since χ′i(x) ≥ 0 for all x and i, we conclude that H˙ ≤ 0 i.e. naive agents
minimize the predictability H , and H → 0 as t→∞. There are many states with
H = 0 and the dynamics select that which is “closer” to the initial condition.
To be more precise, let ∆i(0) be the initial condition (which encodes the prior
beliefs of agents on which action is best). Then, as τ →∞, 〈A〉τ → 0 and ∆(c)i (τ)
converges to
∆
(c)
i (∞) = ∆i(0) + δA, with δA =
∫ ∞
0
dτ〈A〉τ . (4.6)
The condition 〈A〉∞ = 0 provides an equation for δA
0 =
N∑
i=1
χi (∆i(0) + δA) . (4.7)
By the monotonicity property of χi, this equation has one and only one solution.
The asymptotic state of this dynamics is information–efficient (H = 0), but it
is not optimal. Indeed, in general, this state is not a Nash equilibrium. Typically
we find σ2 ∝ N . Only in the special case ∆i(0) = 0 and χi(0) = 0 for all i, we
recover the symmetric Nash equilibrium ~π(0) = (1/2, . . . , 1/2) where σ2 = N .
4.2. Less naive agents ηi > 0
It is easy to check that with ηi > 0, following the same steps as in the previous
section, the learning dynamics of agents minimize the function
Hη = 〈A〉2 −
N∑
i=1
ηim
2
i . (4.8)
Because of the new term,Hη attains its minima on the boundary of the domain
[−1, 1]N . In other words, mi = ±1 for all i which means that agents play pure
strategies ai = mi. The stable states are optimal Nash equilibria for N even.
By playing pure strategies agents minimize the second term of Hη. Of all corner
states where m2i = 1 for all i, agents select those with 〈A〉 = 0 by dividing
into two equal groups playing opposite actions. All these states have minimal
“energy” Hη = −
∑
i ηi. Which of these states is selected depends on the initial
conditions ∆i(0).
Note that the set of stable states is disconnected. Each state has its basin of
attraction in the space of ∆i(0). The stable state changes discontinuously as
∆i(0) is varied. This contrasts with the case ηi = 0 where Eq. (4.7) implies that
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the stationary state changes continuously with ∆i(0) and the set of stationary
states is connected.
ForN odd, similar conclusions can be found. This can be understood by adding
a further agent to a state with N − 1 (even) agents in a Nash equilibrium. Then
Hη = (1 − ηN )m2N , so for ηN < 1 the new agent will play a mixed strategy
mi = 0, whereas for ηN > 1 it will play a pure strategy. In both cases other
agents have no incentive to change their position. In this case we find σ2 ≤ 1.
Summarizing, when agents account for their impact on the aggregate, they at-
tain not only an information–efficient state, but also a optimal Nash equilibrium
with σ2 = H = 0.
It is remarkable how the addition of the parameter ηi radically changes the
nature of the stationary state. Most strikingly, fluctuations are reduced by a
factor N .
4.3. Naive agents learning at a fast rate
The difference between the behavior of naive and non naive agents becomes
even stronger if agents are naive (ηi = 0) and very reactive. In order to quantify
more precisely what we mean, let us assume that†
χi(∆) = tanh(Γ∆), ∀i. (4.9)
Here Γ is the learning rate, which measures the scale of the reaction in agent’s
behavior (i.e. in mi) to a change in ∆i. We also assume that agents have no
prior beliefs: ∆i(0) = 0. Hence ∆i(t) ≡ y(t)/Γ is the same for all agents. From
the results discussed above, we expect, in this case the system to converge to
the symmetric Nash equilibrium mi = 0 for all i. This is not going to be true if
agents are too reactive, i.e. if Γ > Γc, as we shall see shortly.
Indeed y(t) = Γ∆i(t) satisfies the equation
y(t+ 1) = y(t)− Γ
N
N∑
i=1
ai(t)
≃ y(t)− Γ tanh[y(t)] (4.10)
where the approximation in the last equation relies on the law of large numbers
for N ≫ 1. Eq. (4.10) is a dynamical system. The point y0 = 0 is stationary,
but it is easy to see that it is only stable for Γ < Γc = 2. For Γ > 2, a cycle of
period 2 arises, as shown in figure 1. This has dramatic effects on the optimality
of the system. Indeed, let ±y∗ be the two values taken by y(t) in this cycle‡.
Since y(t + 1) = −y(t) = ±y∗ we still have 〈A〉 = 0 and hence H = 0. On the
other hand σ2 = N2y∗2 is of order N2, which is even worse than the symmetric
Nash equilibrium where σ2 = N .
This transition from a state where σ2 ∝ N to a state with σ2 ∝ N2 is generic
† In this section we assume that agents follow a Logit model of discrete choice where the
probability of choice a is proportional to the exponential of the “score” Ua of that choice:
π(a) ∝ eΓUa/2. With only two choices a = ±1, π(a) = (1 + am)/2 and ∆ = U+ − U−, we
recover Eq. (4.9). This learning model has been introduced by Cavagna et al. (1999) in the
context of the MG.
‡ ±y∗ are the two non-zero solutions of 2y = Γtanh(y).
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−1 0 1
y(t)
−1
0
1
y(t
+1
)
Γ=1.8
−1 0 1
y(t)
−1
0
1
y(t
+1
)
Γ=2.5
Figure 1: Graphical iteration of the map y(t) for Γ = 1.8 < Γc and Γ = 2.5 > Γc
in the minority game, as first observed by Savit et al. (1999). Much work has
been done by Johnson et al. to describe this effect quantitatively in terms of
“crowds” and “anti-crows”. This approach is however static and does not reveal
the dynamical nature of the transition, which was first discussed in (Challet and
Marsili, 1999). The transition from these two regimes as the learning rate Γ is
changed has been first observed in (Cavagna et al., 1999) for the MG.
We shall see below that the simple approach followed here can be generalized
to the full minority game and it allows to derive the critical learning rate Γc(α)
as a function of the parameter α of the MG.
5. The MG with information
The same qualitative behavior occurs when agents have access to a public
information represented by an integer variable µ ranging from 1 to P . µ may
either be related to past outcomes of the game (Challet and Zhang, 1997) or, as
first suggested by Cavagna (1999), it may be just randomly and uniformly drawn
from {1, . . . , P}. The idea is that, agents resort to simple schemata or rules,
which prescribe an action for each value of µ. Each agent is initially endowed
with S such rules which are drawn at random among all possible 2P binary
functions. Agents take their choice on the basis of “scores” Us,i which they
assign to each strategy s, and they update scores in a way which is similar to
Eq. (4.2). Savit et al. (1999) has shown that the relevant variable is α = P/N :
Intensive (i.e. N independent) quantities, such as σ2/N , display a behavior which
does not depend on P and N separately, but only on their ratio α. We refer the
interested reader to (Marsili et al., 2000) for a discussion of the general case.
Here we focus on the S = 2 case, where following (Challet and Marsili, 1999;
Challet et al., 2000A), we let s = ±1 be the label of the two possible rules of
each agent and si(t) be the choice actually taken by agent i at time t. Following
the notation of (Challet and Marsili, 1999; Challet et al., 2000A), the action
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taken by agent i at time t, if he/she chooses to follow strategy si(t) is ai(t) =
ω
µ(t)
i + si(t)ξ
µ(t)
i , where µ(t) is the value taken by public information
†. The
decision process of agent i is hence encoded, as in Eq. (4.1) above, in the equation
Prob{si(t) = ±1} ≡ 1±mi(t)
2
, with mi(t) = χi(∆i). (5.1)
Here ∆i(t) is the difference between the scores of the two schemata, which are
updated according to the analog of Eq. (4.2):
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− A(t)ξ
µ(t)
i − ηiξµ(t)i
2
si(t)
N
. (5.2)
Refs. (Marsili et al., 2000; Challet et al., 2000C) have shown that typical
relaxation times in a system of N agents are of order N . In order to have a
meaningful dynamics in the limit N →∞ it is necessary to introduce a rescaled
time τ = t/N . This leads to a deterministic continuum time dynamics (Challet
and Marsili, 1999; Challet et al., 2000A) which is independent of N . The validity
of this description relies on the fact that typically A(t) ∼
√
N and hence |∆i(t+
1) − ∆i(t)| ∼ 1/
√
N is vanishingly small, which makes the continuum time
approach exact as N → ∞. As we shall see, this fails to be true if α < αc and
agents are too reactive, since then A(t) ∼ N .
Within the continuum time description one finds (Challet et al., 2000A; Marsili
et al., 2000) that with ηi = 0 for all i, the behavior of agents again minimizes
predictability H . It can be shown (Marsili et al., 2000) that the payoff of each
agent i increases with ηi in the range ηi ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, also global efficiency
increases. If P > αcN , where αc = 0.3374 . . ., the improvement is smooth as a
function of η. If, on the other hand, P < αcN there is a sudden jump in σ
2 as
soon as agents switch on a small parameter ηi = η. This is shown clearly in figure
2. This feature is captured qualitatively by the analytic calculation (in the replica
symmetric ansatz) of (Challet et al., 2000A; Marsili et al., 2000), whose result is
shown in Figure 3. For α = P/N < αc, as the line η = 0 is crossed from below,
the system undergoes a first order phase transition with a discontinuous jump in
σ2. Note that for Γ ≫ Γc the jump in σ2/N is of more than two decades! This
discontinuity arises because the nature of the stationary state changes abruptly:
For η ≤ 0 a finite fraction of agents play mixed strategies (m2i < 1) whereas for
η > 0 most of them play only pure strategies. For η = 1 all agents play pure
strategies and indeed the system converges to a Nash equilibrium†.
The transition for α > αc occurs at a value ηc(α) > 0 and it is smooth
(second order). A deeper discussion on the nature of this transition and on its
consequences may be found in (Marsili et al., 2000; De Martino et al., 2000).
6. Learning rate in the MG for α < αc
As before, the performance of naive agents (ηi = 0 ∀i) may be much worse for
α < αc if they are too reactive. This is shown numerically in figure 2. The effect
† ωµi and ξmi u are such that ωµi ± ξmi u are two randomly choosen boolean functions of µ
taking values in {±1}.
† Here Nash equilibria are defined with respect to the set of pure strategies si = ±1 which
agents can take. See Marsili et al. (2000) for a detailed discussion.
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η
10−2
10−1
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2 /N
 α>αc ,  Γ>Γc(α)
 α>αc ,  Γ<Γc(α)
 α<αc ,  Γ>Γc(α)
 α<αc ,  Γ<Γc(α)
Figure 2: σ2/N as a function of η for S = 2 and N = 101. Diamonds refer
to P = 8 (α ≃ 0.079 < αc) with Γ = ∞ (open symbol) and Γ ≪ Γc(α) (full
symbol). Squares refer to P = 64 (α ≃ 0.63 > αc) with Γ = ∞ (open symbol)
and Γ≪ Γc(α) (full symbol).
10−2 10−1 100 101 102
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ
2 /Ν η=−0.2
η=0
η=0.02
η=0.2
η=0.6
η=0.8
Nash
Figure 3: Approximate theoretical estimate of global efficiency σ2/N as a func-
tion of α for S = 2 and several values of η within the replica symmetric ansatz.
The arrows mark the values of α to which Fig. 1 refers.
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Figure 4: Plot of A(tk+1)/N vs A(tk)/N for the MG with N = 301 agents, Γ =∞
and P = 16 (α = 0.053 . . .). The sequence tk is such that the information is the
same (µ(tk+1) = µ(tk)). In the inset, the same plot with real time t.
is exactly the same as that discussed previously, in the absence of information
(P = 1 or α ≃ 0): As the learning rate Γ increases, the stationary solution ∆∗i
looses its stability and a bifurcation to a complex dynamics occurs. This is only
possible in the low α phase, where the stationary state is degenerate and the
system can attain 〈Aµ〉 = 0 (intended as a time average) by hopping between
different states‡. The plot of A(t+1)/N vs A(t)/N , in figure 4 shows that indeed
wild fluctuations occur in one time step: a finite fraction of agents change their
mind at each time step. This is what causes, for fixed P , the cross over, first
observed in (Savit et al., 1999), from the linear regime σ2 ∼ N to a quadratic
dependence σ2 ∼ N2.
Clearly the continuum time limit, on which our analysis rests, breaks down
because A(t) ∼ N . Still one can compute the critical learning rate Γc(α) which
marks the onset of complex dynamics. Let us focus attention on one value of
µ = 1 and on the learning model of Eq. (4.9). Let us define the sequence of times
tk such that µ(tk) = 1 for the k
th time. Fig. 4 shows that the dynamics of A in
this modified time is not smooth. We define yi(k) = Γ∆i(tk), which satisfies
yi(k + 1) = yi(k)− Γ
N
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
A(t)ξ
µ(t)
i (6.1)
When N ≫ 1, the sum involves ∼ P = αN ≫ 1 terms and we may estimate
it by the law of large numbers. Let y∗i be the stationary solution (yi(k + 1) =
yi(k) = y
∗
i ) of Eq. (6.1), then we can set yi(k) = y
∗
i + δyi(k) and study the linear
‡ In the asymmetric phase α > αc the stationary state is unique and this effect is not
possible.
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Figure 5: Phase diagram of the MG (ηi = 0) in the (α,Γ) plane.
stability of this solution. With the notation R =
∑
µR
µ/P , we find
δyi(k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
Ti,jδyj(k), Ti,j = δi,j − αΓξiξj(1−m2j) (6.2)
where mj = tanh(y
∗
j ). The solution y
∗
i is stable if the eigenvalues of Ti,j are all
smaller than 1 in absolute value. As Γ increases, the smallest eigenvalue of Ti,j
becomes smaller that −1. Thanks to the results of Sengupta and Mitra (1997),
we have an analytic expression for this eigenvalue, which is λ+ = 1 − Γ(1 +√
α)2(1 −Q)/2. The stability condition λ+ > −1 then turns into
Γ < Γc(α) ≡ 4
[1−Q(α)](1 +√α)2 , Q(α) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
m2i (6.3)
which is our desired result. The function Q(α) is known exactly from the analytic
solution† (Challet et al., 2000A; Marsili et al., 2000). This yields a phase diagram
in the (α,Γ) plane which is shown in figure 5. For α → 0 we find Γc → 4‡.
As α → αc, Γc converges to a finite value (≃ 7.0273 . . .) with infinite slope.
Numerical simulations suggests that, rather than a sharp transition, at Γc(α)
the system undergoes a crossover between two distinct dynamical regimes. In the
asymmetric phase (α > αc) the dynamics is always smooth, hence Γc(α) =∞.
The analysis of the stationary state for Γ ≫ Γc and the calculation of global
quantities such as σ2 is much more difficult than that in the smooth dynamical
† Q(α) is given parametrically by Q = 1 − e−z2/(√πz) − (z2 − 1/2)erf(z)/z2 and α =
erf2(z)/[2z2(1 +Q)].
‡ This differs from our previous result Γc = 2 without information, because with P = 1 in
the MG half of the population has a+,i = a−,i two equal strategies. This reduces by a factor
2 the effective number of adaptive agents, and accordingly Γc takes a factor 2.
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phase (Γ≪ Γc). Johnson et al. (1999) devised an approximate scheme, which ne-
glects the dynamical aspect of the problem, but gives expressions for σ2 in good
agreement with numerical data for α < αc and Γ ≫ Γc(α). A microscopic, sys-
tematic derivation of σ2 is a challenging problem, and we believe the dynamical
system (6.1) is the starting point.
7. Conclusion
In its simplicity, the MG captures and reproduces a great deal of mechanisms,
aspects and properties of real markets. In particular it provides a deep under-
standing of the relation between behavioral assumptions at the micro level and
global macro behavior in a toy market. Here we have shown what properties of
the behavior of agents are responsible for excess volatility in such toy markets.
These are price taking behavior and excessive reactivity (fast learning).
This leaves us with the question of whether and to what extent these con-
clusions extend to real market contexts. Experimental studies in this direction
promise to be very illuminating.
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